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I
INTRODUCTION
Rights policies are everywhere, in name or in form. Nearly every
organization has both general equal-employment-opportunity policies and
specific policies in particular areas, among them sex-harassment policies. Nearly
every police department has highly specific policies on the use of force against
citizens. Nearly every organization that maintains a children’s playground has
some sort of safety policy. Over the last several years, I have studied the
development and spread of these sorts of rights policies, with an eye to
understanding why they have developed and why their administrative depth
varies considerably from place to place.
In answering these questions, I have found my thinking heavily influenced
by three of Marc Galanter’s many contributions to legal scholarship. The first is
his famous argument that “the ‘haves’ come out ahead”1 because they are
organized to gain advantage in iterated legal contestation.2 The second is his
equally famous argument that the so-called “litigation explosion” is all hot air:
litigation rates have not increased appreciably and most injured people do not
sue over their injuries.3 The third is a less famous, but equally perceptive and
powerful observation: the diffuse and ambiguous signals sent by courts gain
meaning in light of the knowledge, resources, and skills of parties to disputes.4
Although at first glance these insights may seem unconnected, together they
help to explain both the development and the continuing variation in rights
policies in the United States. Before suggesting why, this article first discusses
the nature of U.S. rights policies.
II
ADMINISTRATIVE-RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
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In the modern state, rights are empty promises in many contexts unless they
are given life in administrative policies and practices. My research focuses
specifically on administrative-rights policies within government, so the
discussion here is limited to that context. Government policy is made and
remade at the lowest levels of the administrative state where officials—police
officers, social workers, development planners—give meaning to the oftenambiguous goals set by legislatures, courts, and executives, and develop goals of
their own. It is widely believed that in this process, bureaucracies generally
dislike the limits imposed by legal rights and seek, in their administrative
policies and practices, to undermine these rights. That overriding pessimism,
while often justified, should be tempered: U.S. bureaucracies in some contexts
have internalized a wide range of administrative policies and practices favoring
protection for civil liberties and rights.
Consider the example of policing. In 1960, the standard U.S. policedepartment policy governing police officers’ use of force employed highly
general restrictions on shooting at civilians, and shooting training consisted
largely of target practice.5 The decision to shoot, in other words, was left to
individual officers’ best judgment, despite considerable evidence that the
decision to shoot varied widely among officers and often was influenced by the
race of the target.6 With the benefit of hindsight, one can hardly imagine a more
ambiguous policy and a training protocol less aimed at minimizing
inappropriate uses of force. By 2000, the standard U.S. police policy on use of
force specified a “graduated use of force” with specific itemizations of different
levels of force—ranging from voice restraint to discharge of weapons—and the
conditions under which each was legal and appropriate.7 Additionally, police
training in the use of force has come to focus on correct application of the use
of force continuum, and the best training programs also now teach officers how
to defuse tense situations before resorting to the use of force.8
The shift in policing from a general, vague policy on the use of force in 1960
to a highly specific, training-focused policy in 2000 is nothing less than
fundamental. And it is a shift that is characteristic of changes in U.S.
administrative policies toward rights more generally. That is, in the decades
after 1960 and in a host of policy areas, U.S. administrative governance became
significantly, even dramatically, more rights-focused; the rights policies at the
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heart of the change became institutionalized and integrated into government
agencies in substantial administrative depth.9
In some places, nonetheless, local bureaucracies have adopted few of these
rights-based innovations, or they decline to enforce them—particularly with
regard to vulnerable populations. The Chicago police department, for instance,
is currently embroiled in a scandal involving allegations of systematic
mistreatment of the residents of some public housing projects, and allegations
that the department failed to enforce its elaborate rules on police misconduct.10
The dominant theoretical explanation of administrative-rights policies views
the policies as the expression of institutionalized models developed in the face
of ambiguous threats from the legal environment, particularly threats of legal
liability.11 In this view, the organizational field that adopts administrative-rights
policies is itself the source of those policies. Thus, in the area of policing, it
might be argued that police-use-of-force policies grow out of a dynamic within
professional policing itself. Although my research on administrative-rights
policies is informed by such an institutional theory, I have come to think that
the standard focus on institutional norms within organizational fields should be
supplemented by a focus on the generative role of organizational repeat players
external to those organizational fields. My understanding of these issues reflects
the influence of Marc Galanter’s contributions in three areas.
III
GALANTER’S FOUNDATIONAL INSIGHTS
Marc Galanter pioneered a legal-realist interpretation of the dynamics of
legal contestation and legal change over time. His classic article Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead (hereinafter Haves) hypothesized that the powerful
prevail not only in politics, but in law as well.12 In contrast to some observers in
the late 1960s and early 1970s who placed great hope in the transformational
agenda of left-liberal public-interest litigation, Galanter warned that, over time,
interests that are organized so as to maximize legal advantage, that have the
organizational and financial capacities to “play for rules” (rather than for
victories in particular cases), and that have ongoing familiarity with local
jurisdictional rules, officials, and customs are likely to prevail over “one-shot”

9. Charles R. Epp, Implementing the Rights Revolution (Jan. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
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10. See Jamie Kalven, Kicking the Pigeon (2005–2006), http://www.viewfromtheground.com/wpcontent/media/ktp/kicking_the_pigeon.pdf; Craig B. Futterman, H. Melissa Mather & Melanie Miles,
The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago
Police Department’s Broken System, in 23 CIVIL RIGHTS LITGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL
HANDBOOK (Thompson West eds.) (forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
files/brokensystem-111407.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992).
12. Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1.
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litigants whose capacities in these areas are weak and whose time horizon is
limited to the case at hand.13
Regarding the impact of liability on administrative policies, one might
naturally infer from Galanter’s argument that these policies, too, are likely to
reflect the interests of the “haves.” One-shot tort litigants are likely to gain, at
best, small-value buy-offs from private organizations and governments, in the
form of run-of-the mill settlements. These small-value buy-offs are likely to
generate, at best, only symbolic changes in organizational policies or, at worst,
organizational changes that lead to more effective legal domination of one-shot
litigants.14 Thus, in response to threats of liability, organizations may adopt
symbolic policies (such as written employee policies that forbid sexual
harassment), but they are unlikely to implement or enforce those policies.15 Or
organizations may adopt policies and procedures that bring legal challenges
against the organization into the organization, where they are processed (and
rendered harmless to the organization) by internal grievance procedures.16
On the other hand, Galanter’s classic Haves article has a second motif.17 It
suggests that “have-not” parties might gain some of the advantages of the
“haves” by developing repeat-player organizational capacities and longer-term
legal strategies aimed at “playing for the rules,” rather than aiming only for
short-term success in the case at hand.18 In particular, if the “have-nots” can
develop organized litigation-support groups, long-term funding for litigation
campaigns, and long-term strategies for legal change, then they may gain
influence over the development of legal policy.19 If so, one might infer, as well,
that the more organized and sustained the degree of legal challenge to an
organization, the more greatly will the organization be forced to respond with
more substantive changes to its policies and procedures. Thus, in the face of
ongoing, sophisticated threats of legal liability, organizations may adopt
changes that go far deeper than symbolic evasion or internal suffocation of legal
complaints.20
Overall, though, Galanter’s realist Haves argument suggests the hypothesis
that the threat of tort liability may be less potent than assumed by the popular
view. Legally experienced organizations, in this view, are likely to recognize
that few people injured by their activities are likely to sue21 and that most of
13. Id. at 98–104.
14. See id. at 101–04.
15. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1436–37 (1990); see also
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 11, at 1542–47.
16. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the
Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 952–53, 982 (1999).
17. See Charles R. Epp, Comment, The Two Motifs of “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead” and Its
Heirs, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1089 (1999).
18. Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 141–44.
19. Id.
20. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
21. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 3, at 13–15.
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these claims can be bought off relatively cheaply with settlements that leave the
organization’s legal position no worse off.22
Galanter’s famous intervention into the “litigation explosion” genre in
Reading the Landscape of Disputes23 (hereinafter Landscape) is equally realistic,
with equally significant implications for rights-policy development. To the
complaint by many in the mid-1980s that the United States had experienced an
explosion of lawsuits, particularly tort lawsuits, Galanter simply asked, “show
me the numbers.” Thus, he compared rates of tort litigation in the United States
with rates in the past; he compared injury rates with litigation rates (which were
and are dramatically lower than rates of injury, meaning that most of the
injured do not sue); and he compared litigation rates in the United States with
rates in other countries.24 The results, though not a great surprise to social
scientists working in the area, brought together the evidence in a remarkably
clear, coherent, and forceful observation that there simply had been no
litigation explosion.25 Galanter’s analysis in Landscape has been, by any
standard measure of scholarly influence, remarkably influential. I recall
teaching undergraduate courses a few years after its publication and, before it
had percolated even in academia, finding my students uniformly committed to
the “litigation explosion” idea. Upon introducing Galanter’s thesis, my students
would reply, “It can’t be.” But surprisingly often they came around after
carefully reading the article. Now, more than twenty years later, when I teach
the topic, invariably some students anticipate my basic point, echoing
Galanter’s analysis even before reading it. Might we all be so influential!
More to the point, the implications of Landscape for understanding the
development of rights policies are equally significant and profound and point in
the same direction as Haves. If litigation rates have not increased appreciably in
the United States, and if the overwhelming majority of complaints of injuries—
against abusive police officers, for instance—are “lumped,”26 then there is a
remarkably weak incentive (at least in relation to the costs of injury), from the
tort liability perspective, to reform injurious practices. The injured, by and
large, not the injurer, lump their legal claims; it is the injured, then, who bear
the costs of injuries. Litigation’s “bite” is muzzled. Organizations, in response to
such impotent threats of being sued, are likely to adopt administrative policies
on rights that are far less vigorous, reaching, and enforceable than if litigation’s
bite were sharper and deeper.
If we left the matter there, the implications of Galanter’s work for
understanding administrative-rights policies, although important, would fit

22. See Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 101–02.
23. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 124–25 (describing “lumping”
as inaction, where potential claimants do not make a claim because they lack information or access to
information, or decide that litigation costs outweigh their benefits).
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comfortably into a standard realist genre. But Galanter contributed another
insight, with implications for the topic that are nothing short of profound. It is
that incentives provided by law are best understood as “messages”—not
constraints or inducements—and that these messages are likely to be
interpreted in varying ways depending on the standpoint of the listener.27
Specifically, “the messages disseminated by courts do not carry endowments or
produce effects except as they are received, interpreted, and used by (potential)
actors. Therefore, the meaning of judicial signals is dependant on the
information, experience, skill, and resources that disputants bring to them.”28
Although this observation is not nearly as famous as the two previously
mentioned, some prominent scholars, notably Michael McCann, have relied on
it in developing a constitutive theory of law.29 To put the matter bluntly, the
meaning of judicial decisions as understood by academic experts is not what
matters for how organizations interpret and use those decisions; what matters is
how judicial decisions are understood by organizational officials. Therein lies an
insight that threatens—potentially—to upend the implications drawn above
from Galanter’s Haves and Landscape.
If organizational officials believe that the United States has experienced a
litigation explosion; if they believe that their constituents are highly litigious; if
they believe that the liability terrain has shifted against their interests—in sum,
if they believe that litigation’s bite is sharp and deep—then they are likely to act
on the basis of that belief, and not on the contrary information known by realist
academics.
IV
RESEARCH ON THE MEANING OF
TORT LIABILITY FOR DEFENDANT ORGANIZATIONS
The question immediately arising from the foregoing discussion is this: How
do officials in defendant organizations interpret their liability environment,
both with regard to the level of liability threat and the nature of the appropriate
response? Remarkably little is known. In some areas of industry, productdesign engineers believe the messages from products-liability cases are so
ambiguous and contradictory that they largely ignore the law and make design
decisions on the basis of other factors.30 By contrast, human-resources specialists
working for organizational employers have relatively specific understandings of
the law on improper discharge of employees, believing the threat of litigation to
27. Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, supra note 4, at 126–28, 135–38.
28. Id. at 136.
29. MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION 10 (1994); Michael McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715,
732 (1992) (reviewing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)); Michael McCann, Causal Versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the
Difficulty of Being so Positive . . .), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457, 467–68 (1996).
30. GEORGE EADS ET AL., DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 108–09, 123–24 (1983).
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be relatively high—but their understanding is contradicted by reports from
academic, legal interpretations of the law.31 At least one line of research
suggests the importance of examining in detail the perceptions held by
organizational officials.32
As part of a current project on the construction of administrative-rights
policies by local governments, I have interviewed numerous local government
administrators in Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and California. The localities
vary in size, race and class diversity, rate of economic growth, and age of the
public works and roads infrastructure. To get a long-term perspective on the
legal environment of local government, I selected respondents who had served
in local administration for a long time, typically several decades. These included
mainly city managers and assistant city managers, but included as well several
city attorneys, several attorneys in private practice who have represented cities,
several risk managers, and several senior departmental managers. The
interviews were semi-structured and open-ended. Standard question protocols
were pursued in each interview, as well as in other questions that became
appropriate in response to answers to the planned questions. The interviews
were illuminating.
A. Perceptions of the Threat of Litigation
The senior managers interviewed for this study generally shared the popular
belief that the frequency and costs of litigation in the United States are
excessive, and they applied that belief to the local-government context. Typical
observations by respondents included the following:
“Our city is constantly being sued.”

33

“We’re constantly facing new lawsuits.”

34

“One thing or another is always under litigation.”

35

“The threat of litigation is always in the back of your mind.”

36

“What are we supposed to do with all of these lawsuits? If the courts are trying to send
37
a message, hey, we’ve got it.”

These observations (and many others like them) suggest that local
government administrators perceive that they face significant and substantial
(and heightened) threats of liability. Thus, in comparison to empirical studies
on trends in litigation rates, an element of exaggeration apparently affects
managers’ perceptions of the extent of litigation.

31. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful
Discharge, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 47, 64–68 (1993).
32. See, e.g., Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 11, at 1548–51.
33. Interview with respondent #M3 (Apr. 8, 1998).
34. Interview with respondent #M7 (Apr. 13, 1998).
35. Interview with respondent #M8 (Apr. 14, 1998).
36. Interview with respondent #M11 (Apr. 20, 1998).
37. Interview with respondent #M12 (Apr. 21, 1998).
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B. Who Sues (and Who Matters)
Each interview included a number of questions regarding which types of
litigants are perceived as posing the most significant threats and as having the
most significant effects on the policy or administrative process. Many of the
respondents’ observations reflected an apparent recognition by administrators
of the relative power of “repeat players” versus “one-shotters.” Respondents
universally recognized the significance of the relative organizational “staying
power” (as one put it) of a litigant or potential litigant. Organizational litigants,
according to the respondents, nearly always must be taken seriously. In contrast
to at least some one-shotters, their claims are likely to have some merit or basis
and are likely to be advanced with sophistication; and such litigants are less
likely simply to drop their claims. In the perceptions of senior local
administrators, the organizations that must be taken seriously include not only
business organizations, but also cause-advocacy organizations. Thus, one
respondent made a typical observation:
It’s tougher to deal with advocacy organizations than with individual lawyers. Their
constituency base gives them strength, and also means that they have to deal with their
constituents if they compromise too much. They also have more funding typically than
individual lawyers, and thus they can give you a tougher fight, can carry it on longer.
Also, more publicity is generated when an organization is involved—they like to go to
the media, whereas individual lawyers don’t—and then it’s tougher to come to an
agreement. So I’d much rather deal with an individual lawyer than with an
38
organization.

On the other hand, virtually all of the managers observed that individual
lawyers representing run-of-the-mill plaintiffs posed the potential for serious
disruption of city policy. Being a one-shotter, and even a relatively ordinary
one, does not appear necessarily, or even commonly, to place a claimant in a
“not-to-be-taken-seriously” category—but only if the one-shotter is legally
represented.39 As one respondent observed, “All litigants have staying power if
they have an attorney, because most of the time the attorney will be working on
a contingency basis, and so the expenses aren’t out of the plaintiff’s pocket.”40
Additionally, the senior administrators interviewed for this study universally
emphasized significant changes over the last thirty-five years in the capacity of
litigants. The biggest change, in their perception, has been a broadening of the
universe of those who sue or threaten to do so. Thirty-five years ago, the
managers observed, the universe was limited mainly to businesses or real-estate
developers either doing business with localities or developing property within
localities. By the 1970s, businesses were joined by an increasingly diverse range
of individuals and groups, particularly antidevelopment forces, including
neighborhood associations, historical preservationists, environmentalists, civilrights and civil-liberties claimants, and a wide diversity of individuals claiming

38. Interview with respondent #M6 (Apr. 10, 1998).
39. See Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead, supra note 1, at 114.
40. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998).
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personal injuries. The change, in the view of several respondents, has been
dramatic: “Now almost anybody can get a lawyer to take a case; it didn’t used to
be that way.”41
Nonetheless, several of the managers, particularly those in rural or moreisolated cities, made observations suggesting that the expansion and
diversification of the threat of liability may vary significantly by geographical
area. For instance, a lawyer who has both represented cities and sued them
observed, “You know those cops that get fired in the cities because of brutality?
You know where they end up? You think they become garbage collectors? No.
They just get hired as cops in these small towns out here where the rules are
more relaxed and nobody’s going to sue them.”42
Similarly, a manager in an isolated town said, “There aren’t a lot of personal
injury lawyers here. We don’t get sued very much. The last time it happened,
the lawyer was somebody from out of town. I can’t remember where he was
from—I think one of the bigger cities down the road.”43
In sum, senior public managers’ perceptions about who represents a
potential litigation threat are revealing: the universe of perceived sources of
liability threat has become surprisingly broad and diverse. Some administrators
emphasized repeatedly that “anybody” can get a lawyer. That perception
reveals a sort of democratization of the perceived threat of litigation.
Nonetheless, that perceived democratization of threat is not all-pervasive. Even
in urban areas, several managers emphasized that organizational litigants
typically have more staying power than individual litigants and thus pose
greater threats. Moreover, the handful of rural or geographically isolated
respondents interviewed for this study seemed to hold much lower perceptions
of the significance of liability litigation than did their urban counterparts.
C. Administrative Policy Responses
The respondents identified a number of forward-looking, defensive policies
and actions taken by their organizations in order to minimize legal threats.
First, as may be expected, they universally observed that the role of lawyers in
the policy and administrative process has expanded. As one respondent noted,
When I first started this game, you’d bring lawyers in only occasionally, if some
outside party raised a legal concern. Now the city’s lawyers are in on every single
policy discussion, at every stage of the discussion. And if there are high-level
discussions, say between a department head and the city manager, a third person—a
lawyer—is always present. And it is the lawyer who makes the presentation. Not the
44
policy expert.

A second significant, forward-looking effect observed by virtually all the
respondents is what may be called a “systematization of procedures.” In the

41.
42.
43.
44.

Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998).
Interview with respondent #L2 (Apr. 16, 1998).
Interview with respondent #M19 (Aug. 21, 1998).
Interview with respondent #M5 (Apr. 9, 1998).
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area of risk management, this is especially evident. The respondents in each
jurisdiction reported that their government had begun systematically checking
infrastructure thought to pose safety or accident risks—checks, for instance, of
road signs, road conditions, sewer lines, and park and playground equipment. In
each instance, the senior managers emphasized that the key to such
systematization is precise recordkeeping of the nature and timing of both the
checks and the actions taken in response to observed problems. Such
systematization, particularly in recordkeeping, they observed, helps to insulate
the organization from liability. A closely related development is the
systematization of procedures governing relations between the citizen and the
local government. For instance, systematic procedures have been instituted for
approval of (and objections to) development permits, for complaints about
police activity, for injury- or property-damage claims, for discrimination claims,
and for investigations of these claims. Thus, a typical observation is as follows:
The threat of litigation leads to more systematic planning and documentation. Now we
have employees do regular trips down all county roads to check for problems in the
road or missing signs. And we document those trips. So if a sign comes up missing and
causes an accident, we can show that we’d taken steps to avert that problem and that
the problem hadn’t been present in the previous regular check. Years ago, of course
we’d be concerned about road conditions and missing signs. But mainly we’d correct
problems when a call came in, or when an employee happened to notice it. Now the
45
program is more regular, more systematic, and more documented.

A third forward-looking effect of heightened legalization has been the
institution of regularized training for new employees, and, for some types of
employees—particularly the police—periodic continuing training. The types of
training run the gamut. In most of the jurisdictions included in this study,
employees receive training regarding prohibited forms of discrimination,
particularly sex and race discrimination, and harassment. Relatedly, several
respondents emphasized that their governments had adopted “zero tolerance”
policies toward harassment. Police receive training in constitutional law
covering search, seizure, pursuit, arrest, and use of force. Public-works
employees receive training in identifying and reporting problems with streets,
sidewalks, road signs, and other parts of the infrastructure. The extent and rigor
of such training obviously varies. Nonetheless, the senior managers interviewed
for this study universally stressed that an increased emphasis on training has
been among the most important effects of legalization. Even without prodding,
several identified it as the most significant effect.46 One respondent, in sum, tied
all of the defensive policies and actions together: “Responding to the whole
litigation area is like a comprehensive program: you need a comprehensive
policy that covers everything, from getting good legal advice, to planning for

45. Interview with respondent #M9 (Apr. 14, 1998).
46. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998); Interview with respondent #M5 (Apr. 9, 1998);
Interview with respondent #M9 (Apr. 14, 1998).
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known risks, to training employees, to insurance coverage, to being responsive
to citizens’ complaints.”47
V
CONCLUSION
The observations from interviews presented here are only suggestive, but
are potentially significant for understanding administrative-rights policies. As
institutional theories of organizational policies might suggest, organizational
managers perceive appropriate rights policies in light of their understanding of
their legal environment. But this understanding, at least in the public sphere, is
shaped not only by dominant institutional models, but also by very specific
perceptions of the liability threat in their locality. And these perceptions are
best understood in light of Marc Galanter’s theoretical contributions regarding
repeat-player litigants, the so-called litigation explosion, and the role of litigant
capacity in shaping understandings of the meaning of law.48
As Galanter suggested, the diffuse messages sent by courts gain meaning in
light of the perceptions, knowledge, skills, and resources of potential
disputants.49 In the governmental context, senior administrators share some
aspects of Galanter’s legal realism: administrators see liability as a greater
threat to the extent that a potential claimant is supported by organizational
resources and has “staying power.”50 Moreover, they seem to recognize that
many potential claimants lack these capacities and are unlikely to sue or, if they
sue, are unlikely to represent a significant legal threat.51
On the other hand, senior local-government administrators share some
aspects of the naïve, popular view of litigation that Landscape sought to
debunk. They claim to fear widespread litigation and claim that litigation rates
against their governments have virtually exploded. In response, they say that
their governments have adopted “comprehensive systems” of administrative
policies aimed at minimizing governmental harms to protected rights, via
clarified policies, improved training, and improved internal oversight.52
Nonetheless, some administrators, typically those in geographic areas distant
from urban centers, say that the threat of liability is rare and, quite literally,
distant.53 In these contexts, administrative-rights policies appear to be
significantly less developed than in contexts where the perception of liability is
greater.

47. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998).
48. See discussion supra Part III.
49. Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, supra note 4, at 126–28, 135–38.
50. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998); Interview with respondent #M6 (Apr. 10, 1998).
51. Interview with respondent #M4 (Apr. 9, 1998); Interview with respondent #M5 (Apr. 9, 1998);
Interview with respondent #M9 (Apr. 14, 1998).
52. See discussion supra Part IV.
53. Id.
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If these hypotheses are supported by more systematic research, then
organizational-rights policies are possibly influenced not only by dominant
institutional norms, but also by highly specific liability threats related to the
efforts of repeat-player litigants.

